We explore the use of subfield arithmetic for efficient implementations of Galois Field arithmetic especially in the context of the Rijndael block cipher. Our technique involves mapping field elements to a composite field representation. We describe how to select a representation which minimizes the computation cost of the relevant arithmetic, taking into account the cost of the mapping as well. Our method results in a very compact and fast gate circuit for Rijndael encryption. In conjunction with bit-slicing techniques applied to newly proposed parallelizable modes of operation, our circuit leads to a high-performance software implementation for Rijndael encryption which offers significant speedup compared to previously reported implementations.
Introduction
In October 2000, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that it had selected the Rijndael Block Cipher [3] as the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In addition to being the new standard, Rijndael is a cipher that offers a good "combination of security, performance, efficiency, implementability and flexibility" [20] . It has already attained considerable popularity and acceptance. Rijndael is a block cipher with a block size of 16 bytes, each of which represents an element in the Galois Field GF (2 8 ). All operations in Rijndael are defined in terms of arithmetic in this field.
Apart from Rijndael, there are several other instances of the use of Galois Field arithmetic in cryptography and coding theory [10] . The efficiency and performance of such applications is dependent upon the representation of field elements and the implementation of field arithmetic. It is common practice to obtain efficiency by careful selection of the field representation [9, 10, 11] . In particular, it is well-known that the computational cost of certain Galois Field operations is lower when field elements are mapped to an isomorphic composite field, in which these operations are implemented using lower-cost subfield arithmetic operations as primitives [11] . Depending upon the computation involved and the choice of representation, there are costs associated with the mapping and conversion, and a trade-off has to be made between such costs and the savings obtained. The design task is to carefully evaluate these trade-offs to minimize the computational cost.
In addition to an efficient hardware implementation, a good circuit design is also useful in obtaining fast software implementations. Using the technique of bit-slicing [2] a circuit with a small number of gates can be simulated using a wide-word processor. Multiple instances of the underlying computation are thus performed in parallel to exploit the parallelism implicit in a wide-word computer. This technique has been used in [2] to obtain a fast DES implementation.
In this paper, we study the use of composite field techniques for Galois Field arithmetic in the context of the Rijndael cipher. We show that substantial gains in performance can be obtained through such an approach. We obtain a compact gate circuit for Rijndael and use its design to illustrate the trade-offs associated with design choices such as field polynomials and representations. We use our circuit design to obtain a simple and fast software implementation of Rijndael for wide-word architectures. The performances of both hardware as well as software implementations show large gains in comparison with previously reported performance figures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we detail the mapping of Galois Field operations to composite field arithmetic. Section 3 outlines the data-slicing technique for realizing a highly parallel software implementation from a circuit design. In Section 4, we describe the mapping of Rijndael operations to a particular class of composite fields. The selection of field polynomials and representations and the associated optimizations are discussed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively. Finally, in Section 7 we present our results and a comparison with previously reported performance figures for Rijndael. Drawings of our Rijndael encryption circuit are included in the Appendix.
GF Arithmetic and Composite Fields
Composite fields are frequently used in implementations of Galois Field arithmetic [9, 10, 11] . In cases where arithmetic operations rely on table lookups, subfield arithmetic is used to reduce lookup-related costs. This technique has been used to obtain relatively efficient implementations for specific operations such as multiplication, inversion and exponentiation. Much of this work has been aimed at implementation of channel codes. The object has usually been to obtain better software implementations by using smaller tables through subfield arithmetic. Applications to hardware design (such as [10] ) have been relatively infrequent.
Our techniques are directed at both hardware and software implementations. We take advantage of the efficiency obtained by the use of subfield arithmetic, not merely in the matter of smaller tables but the overall low-level (gate count) complexity of various arithmetic operations. The computation and comparison of such gains and cost is dependent upon several parameters -the overhead of mapping between the original and the composite field representations, the nature of the underlying computation and its composition in terms of the relative frequency of various arithmetic operations, and in case of software implementations, the constraints imposed by the target architecture and its instruction set. Based on these parameters we select the appropriate field and representation to optimize a hardware circuit design. As we shall see, there can be several objectives for this optimization, such as critical path lengths and gate counts, depending upon the overall design goals. The circuit design obtained can then be used to obtain parallelism in a software implementation by means of slicing techniques.
As described in [11] , the two pairs
, where Q(y) and P (x) are polynomials of degree n and m respectively. The fields GF ((2 n ) m ) and GF (2 k ), k = nm, are isomorphic to each other. Since the complexity of various arithmetic operations differs from one fieldto another, we can take advantage of the isomorphism to map a computation from one to the other in search of efficiency. For a given underlying field GF (2 k ), our gains depend on the choice of n and m as well as of the polynomials Q(y) and P (x).
While we restrict our description to composite fields of the type GF ((2 n ) m ), it is easy to see that the underlying techniques are fully general and can be used for any composite field.
Slicing Techniques
Bit-slicing is a popular technique [2] that makes use of the inbuilt parallelprocessing capability of a wide-word processor. Bit-slicing regards a W -bit processor as a SIMD parallel computer capable of performing W parallel 1-bit operations simultaneously. In this mode, an operand word contains W bits from W different instances of the computation. Initially, W different inputs are taken and arranged so that the first word of the re-arranged input contains the first bit from each of the W inputs, the second word contains the second bit from each input, and so on. The resulting bit-sliced computation can be regarded as simulating W instances of the hardware circuit for the original computation. Indeed, a bit-sliced computation is designed by first designing a hardware circuit and then simulating it using W -bit registers on the rearranged input described above.
A bit-sliced implementation corresponding to an N -gate circuit requires N instructions to carry out W instances of the underlying computation, or N/W instructions per instance. This can be particularly efficient for computations which are not efficiently supported by the target architecture. Consider for instance GF (2 8 ) multiplication on AltiVec [4] . The straightforward implementation uses three table-lookups and one addition modulo 255. 16-parallel lookups in a 256-entry table can be performed on AltiVec in 20 instructions. Thus, a set of 128 multiplications would require 488 instructions. In comparison, our 137-gate multiplication circuit translates into a bit-sliced implementation that can perform 128 multiplications in 137 instructions! The above computation ignores the cost of ordering the input in bit-sliced fashion and doing the reverse for the output. To evaluate the trade-off correctly, this cost has to be taken into account as well. In general, this cost will depend on the target instruction set.
However, it is possible to think of scenarios in which a particular operation may be efficiently supported in an architecture. For example, if the AltiVec architecture were to provide an instruction for 16 parallel GF ( 2 8 ) multiplications which use the underlying field polynomial of interest to us (a hypothetical but nonetheless technically feasible scenario since the critical path of the multiplication circuit is only six gates deep), then a direct computation would require only eight instructions, compared to the 137 required by the bit-sliced version. Now consider GF ( 2 16 ) multiplications on this hypothetical version of the AltiVec architecture. It is easy to see that the most efficient computation is neither a direct one, nor a bit-sliced version, but a byte-sliced computation, in which each GF (2 16 ) multiplication is mapped to a small number of GF (2 8 ) operations, which are efficiently supported by the architecture in question. In general, the right "slice" to use would depend on the target architecture.
Encrypting without Chaining
Our Rijndael implementation processes 128 blocks of data in parallel. Traditionally, such a scheme would be regarded as more useful for decryption than for encryption, since encryption is usually performed in inherently sequential modes such as Cipher Block Chaining or CBC [17, 18, 19] . The well-known CBC [17, 18, 19] is used as a defense against replay attacks [12] . In the CBC mode of encryption, parallel blocks would not be available for encryption except where data from many streams is encrypted in parallel.
However, a new parallelizable variant of CBC [7] removes this limitation and makes it possible to use CBC encryption without the usual sequentiality. This makes it possible to utilize the high throughput rates of our implementation in conjunction with the popular CBC mode.
Rijndael in a Composite Field
Rijndael involves arithmetic on GF (2 8 ) elements. In a straightforward implementation, inverse, multiplication and substitution are likely to be the operations that determine the overall complexity of the implementation. The most common approach is to use table lookups for these operations. By mapping the operations into a composite field, we are able to obtain both a small circuit in case of a hardware implementation as well as smaller instruction counts and table sizes in case of software implementations.
For
2 ). We selected the field polynomial Q(y) = y 4 + y + 1 for GF (2 4 ). For P (x), we consider all primitive polynomials of the form P (x) = x 2 + x + λ where λ is an element of GF (2 4 ). There are four such polynomials, for each of which there are seven different transformation matrices to consider, one corresponding to each possible choice of basis. The criterion used by us to compare various choices is the gate count of the resulting Rijndael circuit implementation.
Rijndael operations translate to the composite field representation as follows. H denotes the mapping from GF (2 8 ) to GF ((2 4 ) 2 ), and T the corresponding transformation matrix -that is, H(x) = Tx. S is a 4 × 4 matrix (the state) on which all operations are performed.
-ByteSub transformation : This has essentially two sub-steps:
1. P ij = (S ij ) −1 . In the composite field, H(P ij ) = (H(S ij )) −1 . The calculation of an inverse is as follows. Every A ∈ GF ((2
where A is a fixed 8 × 8 matrix and c ∈ GF (2 8 ).
In the composite field, H(Q ij ) = H(AP ij ) + H(c) = TAP ij + H(c) = TAT −1 H(P ij ) + H(c).
-ShiftRow transformation : This step is independent of representation.
-MixColumn transformation : This involves essentially the computation P ij = a 1 S 1j + a 2 S 2j + a 3 S 3j + a 4 S 4j , where (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ) is a permutation of (01, 01, 02, 03). In the composite field,
The following observations are useful in the implementation -
2 ) then H(01) × x = x as the identity element is mapped to the identity element in a homomorphism.
• H(03) = H(02) + H(01).
-Round Key addition : The operation is P = S + K where K is the round key.
In the composite field, H(P ) = H(S) + H(K). Addition is simply an EXOR in either representation.
The mapping of the arithmetic to the composite field together with judicious choice of the field polynomial gives us a substantially smaller circuit, as we shall see in Section 7.
Optimizations
All operations in the Rijndael block cipher are in GF (2 8 ). As outlined in section 4, some of these GF (2 8 ) operations have relatively inefficient gate circuit implementations and can be implemented more efficiently in some isomorphic composite field. One overhead in using subfield arithmetic is the cost of the conversion from the original to the composite field and vice-versa. To illustrate, consider our Rijndael implementation, which uses subfield arithmetic. The cost of the transformations is dependent on the choice of the composite field. We describe below a method by which an efficient 1 transformation matrix from the set T = {T 0 , T 1 , ....} of valid transformation matrices can be chosen.
Let C(θ) denote the cost of the operation θ, which in the present case is taken to be the gate count of the circuit implementation of θ. Depending upon design objectives and application, there can be alternative cost measures, such as the depth of the critical path, for instance. Let W(x) denote the hamming weight of x, i.e., the number of 1s in the polynomial representation of x.
The aim is to find T * , the most efficient transformation, and the corresponding choice of composite field. This is the composite field which minimizes the gate count of the Rijndael circuit implementation. Note that while comparing the cost for different transformations, we need to consider only those Rijndael operations whose costs are dependent upon the choice of composite field. The relevant operations are those which involve λ or the conversion matrices (T and T −1 ). The costs of different operations are:
-Transform : This step involves computing H(S).
Thus, C(Transform) = 16 × C(T.x). -ByteSub transformation :
As noted earlier, this step consists of an inverse calculation and an affine transform -
The only operation whose cost depends on the choice of field is the calculation of λa -ShiftRow transformation : This step does not require any computation.
-MixColumn transformation :
As note earlier, this step is the computation
Since H(01).x = x, C(mixClm) = 16 × (C(H(02).x) + C(H(03).x)). -Round Key addition : The computation is H(P )=H(S)+H(K), so C(addKey)
T * depends upon whether a pipelined (unrolled loop) or iterative (loop not unrolled) Rijndael circuit is to be obtained. The former offers superior performance compared to the latter at the cost of a larger gate count. 1 In terms of the Rijndael gate-circuit implementation. 2 
Note that W(H(c)) is the number of not gates required to implement H(c)+x
, where
The criterion for the best transformation can be represented as follows:
i.e.
where m and n are both 1 for an iterative circuit, and R and R − 1 respectively for a pipelined circuit, where R is the number of rounds as specified in the Rijndael cipher.
Based on these considerations, we selected the polynomial P (x) = x 2 + x + ω 14 . That is, we chose λ to be ω 14 where ω is the primitive element of GF (2 4 ). The following transformation matrix maps an element from GF ( 2 8 
Finding a Transform
A method for generating a transformation matrix to map elements of GF (2 k ) to GF ((2 n ) m ) can be found in literature [11] for the case where all the field polynomials involved are primitive polynomials. However, in the case of Rijndael the field polynomial is R(z) = z 8 + z 4 + z 3 + z + 1 is an irreducible polynomial but is not primitive. Since the fields involved are small, we use an exhaustive search method that can find the transformation in question in case R(z) is irreducible but not primitive. The basic idea is to map α, the primitive element of GF ((2 n ) m ) to γ, a primitive element of GF (2 n ), such that field homomorphism holds.
The algorithm is composed of the following three steps -
]. Note that this step preserves the multiplicative group homomorphism -for
If so then we have the required mapping; else repeat this step for the next primitive element. This is to verify additive group homomorphism, which requires that 
Performance
Our performance figures reported below are for Rijndael encryption circuit and software, which assume key size of 128 bits. Our core circuit for Rijndael encryption contains less than four thousand gates. For the purpose of comparison, we report numbers based upon a circuit with 520 I/O pins that uses multiple cores in parallel. Table 2 lists cycle counts and target architectures for various reported implementations. In our case, the numbers apply to any architecture that can support bitwise AND and EXOR in addition to LOAD and STORE operations. The three numbers we report correspond to architectures with effective datapath widths (number in parenthesis) of 256 bits, 384 bits and 512 bits respectively (this is perhaps the interesting range of architectures today). The cycle count goes down with increasing datapath width.
It may be mentioned that no minimization or synthesis tools were used for our circuit -the only minimization used is in the sense of section 5. The only gates in our circuit are XOR, AND and NOT gates. [14] 210 (Alpha 21264) Wollinger et al. [15] 228 (TMS320C6x) Aoki et al. [1] 237 figure 8 shows the Inverse8 operation in Figure 4 . Square4 is from [11] ; Mult4 and Inverse4 are from [9] 
